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FORCE STRUCTURES:
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
IN THE COMING DECADE



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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Karl W. Robinson

Author

Lieutenant Colonel David E. Shaver

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Mrs. Janet C. Smith

**FORCE STRUCTURES:
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by

Lieutenant Colonel David E. Shaver


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COMMENTS

Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050



FOREWORD

This paper examines the determinants of force structure: "drivers," issues, variables, and options for the future. The author presented an outline of this paper to the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society at the University of Chicago on 30 September 1988. The seminar's theme was "U.S. National Security Strategy: New Challenges and Opportunities." The paper also will be published in a collection of presentations under the seminar title for the Chief of Staff, Army, in May-June 1989.

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate ideas on how to think about force structuring the armies of NATO in the coming decade. The author addresses the questions of "What are our real objectives? What concepts should guide us in the pursuit of these objectives? And what means shall we (can we) employ to accomplish them?" The author contends that the drivers of force structure are national policy, the environment, resources, and mission capabilities. He follows discussion of the drivers with analysis of the issues most pertinent to the current national security environment including burdensharing, threat perception, arms control, national priorities, trade and budget deficits. The author then provides us a framework of variables for selection in the development of six different scenarios for the future and their resultant force structure implications.

MILITARY FORCE LEVELS.
Karl W. Robinson
(JES)
Colonel, IN
Director, Strategic Studies
Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID E. SHAVER is a Strategic Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Institute. His previous assignments have included command of combat engineer battalions in the 1st and 8th Infantry Divisions; Chief, Military Engineering and Topography Division, USAREUR; and S-3, 937th Engineer Group. In Vietnam he served as a unit commander and staff officer in the 62nd Engineer Battalion (Land Clearing). He received a Bachelor's Degree from the University of Nebraska-Omaha and an M.S. from Florida Institute of Technology. Colonel Shaver is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. He is a coauthor of *Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Army Perspectives*, *How to Think About Conventional Arms Control: A Framework*, and *Burdensharing and Mission Specialization in NATO*.

FORCE STRUCTURES: THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE IN THE COMING DECADE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate ideas on how to think about force structuring the armies of NATO, including the U.S. Army, in the coming decade. A new U.S. Administration, President Gorbachev's United Nations speech, the apparent resolution of several regional conflicts, dialogue between the United States and the PLO, conflict with Libya and increasing U.S. domestic political pressure to reduce defense spending via allied burdensharing, arms control negotiations, base closures, and/or unilateral U.S. force reductions have produced an exceptional, current world environment. The current situation presents a formidable challenge to the long-range defense planner ". . . to determine how the strategic environment might look; identify U.S. national interests (and NATO interests); examine how the Army might best support those interests; and provide the Army leadership with the requisite options upon which to base a course of action."¹

THE QUESTIONS

Since force structuring is formulating the means to accomplish assigned tasks and execute plans in support of overall U.S. military strategic goals and objectives, we must begin our discussion by asking basic questions concerning the future strategic environment for which the force structure will be required.

General Andrew Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, recently challenged the Regional Conflict Working Group of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy with these questions:²

- What are our real objectives? What do we really want?
- What concepts should guide us in pursuit of these objectives?
- What means shall we (can we) employ to accomplish them?

What may be implied from General Goodpaster's questions is that we need to widen the aperture of our world focus . . . from concentrating almost exclusively on the Soviet threat to formulating new strategic concepts which respond to a variety of global threats. Of his three questions, the first one remains the most important and the most difficult to answer. The Regional Conflict Working Group in its report, *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict*, attempted to answer the first question:

Survival as a free and independent nation with values and institutions, freedoms and security intact through healthy economic growth, a 'threat-free' stable and secure world, continued growth of freedom, democratic institutions and free market economies (fair and open international trading system) and healthy and vigorous alliances.

Stability, security, freedom and economic growth mentioned by the Working Group seem straightforward, if somewhat oversimplified, objectives in a world in which traditional national/religious rivalries, increasing economic problems, and human rights deprivations persist. But are these the objectives we really seek in the near term future, a future obscured by broiling arguments concerning Mr.

- Gorbachev's announced intentions versus the reality of existing Soviet military capabilities, arms control, U.S. domestic problems, burdensharing, trade

protectionism and deficits, negative defense budget growth and the perception of a diminishing Soviet threat?

Most objectives are brief descriptions of aspirations that move people and organizations to exert effort cooperatively. Seldom are objectives concrete or precise. They are necessary but not sufficient guides to common effort. Containing the Soviets, deterring wars, and encouraging democratic tendencies all admit to at least two or more policies and strategies to achieve them. We should not pretend that identifying and rationalizing strategic objectives is any more than the beginning of a process of trying to know what we want of the world. Because strategic objectives are necessarily very broad in how they are stated, they leave ambiguous any sense of means to ends. Policy reduces the ambiguity but may not eliminate it, so it is important to be clear about policies, even moreso than about objectives.

In this paper we will not concentrate on the individual answers to General Goodpaster's three questions. We will instead focus on assessing force structure options for the future which will comprise answers to all three questions taken as a package. By varying ends, ways and means relative to national policies, the world and domestic U.S. environments, and national and alliance current and emerging resources and capabilities, the author will develop force structure options for the long-range planner to assess which address today's pressing national security issues.

OPTION DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY

There is only one logical way to formally address force planning--through a military cost-risk analysis.

Force planning is complex and is characterized by an interrelated series of analyses to determine an affordable force. It begins by establishing the minimum risk force requirements and accepts resource and time constraints to develop the program, budget, and current forces. Throughout this process, the key consideration is how to execute successfully the national military strategy and to keep risk to a minimum

Force development begins with requirements for doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment derived from a concept of how-to-fight. These requirements initiate the three force development tasks: designing unit models, developing force structure, and documenting unit authorizations The resource-driven force structuring process determines the mix of units for a balanced force and how many units the Army can afford in our resource-constrained environment

The above excerpts from an Army War College text describe in summary what a difficult and complicated task force structuring really is. The long-range force structure planner must be aware of what other strategic planners foresee, as well as understand the predictions of those outside the military community, including academic strategic thinkers, budgeteers, and futurists. These external "visionaries" provide forecasts which stress the expected, rather than the unexpected or the catastrophic. They concentrate on relevant time periods and circumstances which can be extrapolated from the current world.⁷ Although these external sources all use some amount of intuition, most use logical steps to qualify their forecasts with recognized expert judgments or well-accepted assumptions.⁸ The value of their contributions must be weighed by the long-range force structure planner in terms of the logic and credibility of the methodologies used.

In this discussion the author offers a different methodology for developing tomorrow's force structure alternatives. The process is outlined below:

- Select the influences or "drivers" which strongly affect force structure decisions.
- Build brief crisis scenarios within each "driver" which encompass the questions (ends, ways and means).
- Determine and integrate into the scenarios the issues most pertinent to the process.

- Assess the impact of the issues upon the scenarios.
- And finally, determine the size, composition, mission capability and stationing variables for each force structure option.

First of all, let's discuss the "drivers" which strongly influence force structure decisions. For example, the military planning methodology for Army force structuring cruised along efficiently for several years without any changes in the Army's selected personnel strength ceiling of 781,000. The author does not question the rationale behind sustaining such a constant force over time; but last year the Army was jolted by a reduction to a personnel ceiling of 772,000, brought about by congressional initiative and a responsive (to the White House) Army leadership. The defense budget process "drove" force structure to lower levels. This force structure reduction is not presented here as a case study, but as an example of an external influence which caused unplanned, internal force structuring decisions. There are a number of these influential "drivers" external to the military, and identifying them is the first step necessary in the author's option development methodology.

THE DRIVERS

A primary assumption of this methodology is that future force structure decisions are made by external "drivers," e.g. national policy, the environment, resources and capabilities, more than by the formal military force structure planning process. Future force structuring is then a function of the "drivers," where:

- *National Policy* is a compilation of stated or implied policy objectives (deterrence, safeguards, assistance to friends and reduction of Soviet influence); policy realities (America first, containment, freedom fighter support,

human rights); and policy perceptions by others; where:

- *The Environment* is framed by threat assessment (regional in structure), international economic issues (trade deficits, competition, interdependence, protectionism); international diplomacy (peace euphoria, arms control, United Nations initiatives); and psychosociological situations (human rights, drugs, failure of communism, movement to democracy); where:
- *Resources* are a dominant force (in prioritization, defense versus domestic needs, deficit reduction, successful arms control response to unilateral Soviet withdrawal, and alliance burdensharing); where:
- *Capabilities* include alternative choices of quantity versus quality, nuclear versus conventional; and an endless array of high-tech advances in reconnaissance, target acquisition, accuracy and lethality.

These "drivers" may operate independently or combine to influence force structuring decisions. A secondary assumption is that force structure can be further driven by crises in the functional areas presented above, or likewise, by the absence of crisis. As an example, witness how the U.S. military buildup from the "hollow Army" of yesterday was justified to some extent as a needed response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet conventional buildup. By varying the conditions of crisis or calm in the "drivers," we can formulate plausible scenarios which enable us to isolate a selected "driver" and determine its force structure impact.

THE ISSUES

National security issues impact upon force structure decisions, but they are more problematic and pragmatic than drivers. Differing views, between nations and NATO allies; between political factions; and between legislative and executive governmental bodies create issues which will be resolved or remain unresolved as we progress toward the next century. In this particular option development methodology, we have selected for discussion the issues of allied burdensharing, perception of Soviet threat, national priorities, arms control, international trade, and zero-to-negative defense budget growth.

Burdensharing is the most complex issue facing the NATO Alliance. It can be defined simply as sharing the risks, roles, and responsibilities among NATO partners on a "fair" basis, commensurate with each nation's ability to contribute. The issue is cyclic in nature; one that takes on added importance during periods of U.S. defense budget decline. At the heart of the issue is NATO's failure to define what constitutes a "fair share" of the alliance defense burden. Since neither the United States nor our NATO allies have been willing to systematically negotiate burdensharing standards which could be acceptable for all parties, we are deluged with a number of reports, commentaries, and articles on the subject from both sides of the Atlantic. Some highlights are:

- *Report of the Defense Burdensharing Panel.*⁹ Called the Schroeder Report, it concludes that, based on military expenditure percentage of Gross Domestic Product-(GDP) figures, neither our NATO allies nor the Japanese are spending enough on defense and are instead still dependent upon the United States. It further suggests that since Europeans and the Japanese are world economic powers, they must break away from their regional perspectives and take a worldwide defense role.

- *Fair Shares: Bearing the Burden of the NATO Alliance.*¹⁰ A U.S. Defense Budget Office project, this report finds that the burdens of the alliance are so complex, they cannot be measured by a single, simplistic formula such as GDP figures.
- *Pooling Allied and American Resources to Produce a Credible Collective Conventional Deterrent.*¹¹ Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr. calls for a rethinking of the NATO Alliance by developing a new two-pillar treaty based upon U.S. nuclear deterrence.
- *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense.*¹² This annual Department of Defense report concludes that U.S. allies contribute far more to defense than is normally recognized. The report also concludes that the alliance must do more to ensure Western security.

There is an entire "cottage industry" of writers contributing to the burdensharing debate. Whether this debate will be settled in time to influence force structuring decisions in the near future is doubtful, but if the issue is resolved, the results might have a dramatic impact upon U.S. and European force structure. If the burdensharing issue is not resolved, this too may impact on future force structures by increasing U.S. national pressure for a conventional arms control agreement, and/or by increasing pressure for U.S. unilateral reductions, contributions to NATO and/or NATO defense specialization which capitalizes on the expertise of specific NATO nations by assigning them alliance-wide responsibility for specific strategic, operational or tactical roles and missions.¹³

- *Perception of the Soviet Threat* is an issue as important as burdensharing and arms control. By restricting naval operations to near Soviet coastal waters, hinting at pulling out of Cam Ranh Bay, announcing unilateral force cuts at the United Nations, withdrawing

from Afghanistan, encouraging Communist allies to disengage throughout the Third World, and allowing openness through his policies of "glasnost" and "perestroika," Mr. Gorbachev has seized all of the "high ground" in the diplomatic arena. His political actions appear to many to raise the threshold of war.

Since the United States and its major NATO Alliance partners rely heavily on a threat-driven strategy to construct military budgets, the diminishing threat (perception) may logically lead to diminishing military budgets, which in turn lead to diminishing force structure, and the ever smaller budget spiral continues unabated as the threat continues to diminish.¹⁴

This issue may severely affect the U.S. and European force structures of the next decade. Yes, we will continue to be vigilant. Yes, we will caution others against irrational force structure reductions based upon Soviet policy announcements rather than completed policy implementation; but how long can we sustain that position if the Soviets *do* everything they have stated they will, including substantial reductions in their defense capabilities?

Although a novice in forecasting future events, the author is not hesitant to predict Mr. Gorbachev's next strategic moves:

- Withdrawal of short-range nuclear forces (SNF) from Eastern Europe to the USSR to create a nuclear free zone on his side of the "Iron Curtain" and prompt Western response in kind.
- Formal destruction of the Berlin Wall, but with measured constraint on East-West passage, as a symbolic war termination initiative to end the Cold War.
- Formal abolition of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) to prompt NATO's demise and end American involvement in Europe.

Plausible initiatives such as these are not studied or debated often within the U.S. military. We must "speak with one voice" on matters pertaining to national security, or at least censure discussion through document security classification procedures. But these are real, possible strategic initiatives which need to be explored, not only within the military, but in strategic think tanks, newspaper editorials, academic journals, and elsewhere to develop political strategies to retake the "high ground" of world diplomatic leadership in the next decade.

National Priorities in the United States, unlike in European nations, do not seem to center on the "guns versus butter" debate. In the United States we are blessed with strong special interest groups which lobby long and hard for their domestic concerns and seem to fight among themselves for a market share of the "butter" budget. Most Americans and their elected representatives favor a strong national defense establishment. However, the American public becomes highly critical of defense spending when cases of waste, fraud, corruption, and abuse occur, or when new weapon systems are exceedingly costly (the B-2 Bomber, for example). The current debate on defense expenditures focuses on high cost, high-tech versus low cost, low tech approaches to national defense. Current circumstances would appear to dictate acceptance of zero-to-negative defense budget growth over the next several years in favor of increased domestic spending and deficit reduction. Advocates of high cost, high-tech make a strong case that science and technology can replace costly force structure with costly, but more effective, more lethal weapon systems. Those who see this argument clearly propose that limited dollars should be spent on hardware such as aircraft carriers, submarines, strategic lift, and high-tech battlefield systems, e.g., ATACMS, TACIT RAINBOW, "competitive strategies" systems, and modern, survivable strategic missiles and bombers, • because they perceive that *time* is the critical factor in mobilization, and there will not be enough of it to build these high ticket items in the next war.

Those who favor low cost, low tech solutions see a different war tomorrow, one that will be fought in the deserts, jungles, and plains of Third World countries via low intensity conflict, special operations, military assistance and training. All are concepts which require soldiers and Marines, lightly but lethally equipped. These advocates are against force structure cuts as acceptable trade-offs for the high cost, high-tech equipment.

This is not an either/or, but may be a "zero-sum" game. The result of debate will be a compromise which will allow some level of both positions. The issue is who gets how much. Obviously, both defense arguments will affect force structure decisions, with still an outside chance that domestic priorities may severely reduce defense expenditure.

Arms Control is another complex issue which has the potential of greatly influencing force structure decisions. Although negotiations at the strategic level in the Strategic (Nuclear) Arms Reduction Talks (START) seem to be the most important to the United States and its allies, due to the importance of nuclear deterrence in NATO's doctrine of flexible response, conventional arms control negotiations may have a greater impact upon force structuring decisions.

At the crux of the conventional arms control issue is once again, time. It has taken over a year to determine wording and format for the conventional arms control talks in the recently concluded "mandate" phase. The talks will progress slowly through the "data exchange" phase to actual proposals and counterproposals. During the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, the data exchange between NATO and the Warsaw Pact took years to negotiate, and the MBFR talks lasted over 15 years without reaching agreement. Although the Soviet negotiators in the new talks seem to be more flexible and results-motivated under Mr. Gorbachev's firm leadership, indications from the length of time it took to reach agreement on the mandate for the talks forecast a long

process of tough, step-by-step negotiations not only with the Soviets, but within the NATO Alliance itself.

Conventional arms control is interrelated to other issues presented in this paper. It is related directly to burdensharing because one of the difficult issues for NATO to resolve is how to allocate Western reductions. Without resolution of fair shares, how will NATO determine which nation will be the recipient of force structure reductions, which may be interpreted as a windfall reduction in defense budget outlays? Since Mr. Gorbachev has seized the diplomatic "high ground" with his recent initiatives, threat perception in the NATO public sector has decreased and national priorities which stress strong defenses are vacillating. A successful conventional arms control agreement, which includes asymmetrical Warsaw Pact cuts comprised of both "bean counts" of major weapons systems and of various military operational and tactical capabilities including force regeneration, may not be in the U.S. national interest. Even prior to recent Continental United States (CONUS) base closure agreements, the U.S. military base capacity was insufficient to house any significant number of forces returning from Europe. Since existing military basing will not permit the restationing of large forward deployed troop units in the United States, without high capital investment in housing and facilities, stationing and mission alternatives must be found or the returning forces will be decremented from the active force strength. Without alternative mission tasks and creative stationing ideas, even with an active-to-reserve conversion on a one-for-one basis, readiness will suffer and mobilization requirements for strategic lift will be astronomical and cost prohibitive. Retaining these currently forward deployed forces in the U.S. military, in the aftermath of a successful conventional arms control agreement, will require our military leadership's most creative talent and marketing skills. The Army leadership must explore alternatives for its active force structure other than in combat missions. Nation building, the antidrug war, civic action and other missions must receive a market share of the

- Pentagon's "brain trust" if reductions are to be stayed. If not, Army planners need to develop detailed plans, not only for the reductions, but for balancing the remaining risk.

Trade is critical to the very existence of nations today. Trade imbalances, protectionism, and interdependence among nations have the attention of governments and publics. This overall issue may have a greater impact on force structure than any other. In 1992, the European Economic Community will drop its national trade barriers to form an integrated European trade structure. When the wealth of U.S. allies, as measured in GDP, is \$7.8 trillion,¹⁵ as compared with the U.S. GDP of \$4.7 trillion, and with the concurrent rise of Japan as a leader in world trade, the United States may become outflanked. Interdependence is deemed essential in today's world; however, trading partner deficits, debtor nation status, the "buy out" of America, heightened competition from emerging nations and a continuing Soviet economic disaster may contribute to military conflict. Military alliances could fracture because of economic conflict.

In recent history, major economic powers have avoided trade wars but we are currently involved in point-counterpoint battles with Europe concerning beef exports and with Japan concerning closed markets. How these battles will be fought, who wins and loses, the impact of economic trade war on the U.S. economy and, thus, on the U.S. military budget will have dramatic implications for military force structure. An economic trade war may qualify for what Theodore J. Gordon has described as a "covert" war:

What is a covert war? Simply this--a war in which no nation, other than the aggressor, is a combatant. It is a war waged in secret.¹⁶ It is a war which can be waged in an otherwise peaceful world.

In the author's estimation, the United States is involved in a covert war as described by Gordon, but we are the victim, not the aggressor. We need to understand how to fight such a war and must take the offensive to win. There

are no college or military education courses which teach the integration of economic and military arts to win trade battles. The author's vision of such a course syllabus would need to include this integration, not separate studies in the exercise of economic or military power. It is understood that certain military missions would remain the same, but others such as military assistance to the economic sector remain unexplored. The author begs the question "how to fight?" before a force structure can be developed. Military threat assessments only gloss over this new covert war. We need to begin our schooling in this area now, before it is too late.

Zero-to-Negative Defense Budget Growth simply will be a reality for the next several administrations, until the federal deficit is finally resolved. The same future awaits many of our allies in Europe. This reality means we have to "do more with less" (which doesn't work very well over time) or we must "do less with less" (which doesn't work very well either). The choices are tough. Budget "enhancers" such as base closures, burdensharing and arms control are not national security enhancers. In such an environment the Soviet risk must be countered by sound planning, creative ideas and leadership judgment, but, in the end, results rest in the hands of external drivers--national policies, the environment, resources and capabilities. Long-range planners must be pragmatic and parochial, but should also be visionaries, or smart enough to consult with those who have a plausible view of what the future may bring. We have moved from threat-driven strategies to resource-driven strategies--and these new strategies require effort; effort which seems to be wasted in the formal military procedures of developing the minimum risk, planning, objective, and program forces before arriving at the resource-constrained budget and current force structure. We need to meld these joint service planning exercises into one effort for the President's

- budget and Five-Year Defense Plan. We need to shrink commitments we make to ourselves, like protecting the world's sea lines of communication. If we pare down our commitments, the void will either be filled with allied "out

of area" forces or it will not be filled at all. Zero-to-negative defense budget growth will precipitate headquarters consolidations, unit deactivations or conversions, and procurement stretch-outs, cancellations, and postponements. On the positive side, NATO host nation support, cooperative research and development, standardization and interoperability may flourish. Real defense budget decline may force us to return to successful American *business* practices like lease versus buy, sale and lease back, leveraging assets and subcontracting. When ethical business procedures are finally imposed upon the military, we may be purchasing more defense with less money. In any event, the budget issue looms as the greatest factor in force structure planning.

THE VARIABLES

Returning to our discussion of the option development methodology, we must next determine the variables of the force structure we seek. Simply stated, the variables include size, composition, mission capability, and stationing of the future force.

The size variable appears to be the easiest one to address. Small, medium, large, and extra large seem to cover the full spectrum of force structure size variation. Those who forecast conditions which may lead to a smaller Army in the coming decades include authors of the *Army Long-Range Planning Guidance*,¹⁷ virtually all futurists, relevant Congressmen (Nunn, Levin), the Germans, the Soviets, and a few Army long-range planners whose names shall go unmentioned to protect the innocent. Advocates of conventional force buildup appear to be reacting to decreased reliance on nuclear deterrence, as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the potential for similar, future nuclear arms control agreements, rather than to any other justification.

The separate variable of force composition includes: Active or Reserve Component mix, nuclear/conventional mix, and light versus heavy design. The mission capability variable includes: mission specialization among the U.S. military services (U.S. Army light infantry versus USMC objective force, for a provocative example); mission specialization within NATO (effects of burdensharing and/or successful conventional arms control agreement); and impacts of emerging technologies (modernization). Finally, the stationing variable which includes: strategic mobility versus forward stationing and Europe versus Third World focus.

Each of these variables has an imaginary "dial setting" associated with it. For example, the size variable dial setting has been explained by small, medium, and large; the force composition variable has three dials to set--active or reserve, nuclear to conventional, and light versus heavy. These variable dial settings are the "bottom line" solutions to the option development methodology. Each option we select for analysis will ultimately result in setting the variable dials.

A review of the option development methodology includes:

- Selecting a force structure driver.
- Building a brief scenario around the driver, including crisis or calm conditions.
- Determining the primary issues involved in the scenario.
- Assessing the impact of the issues upon the force structure driver, including the associated threat.
- Selecting the variable dial settings most suited to the logical, predictable, or intuitively plausible choice of force structure in each scenario.

We will now develop six potential options for *Force Structures: The United States and Europe in the Coming Decade* derived from six alternative scenarios, which will provide answers to General Goodpaster's three questions: What is our objective? What concept is available to achieve it? And what resources does the concept need?

THE OPTIONS

Option 1. For scenario development the author has selected the driver--national policy; the condition--crisis; and the issues--conflicting national priorities, diminishing threat perception and burdensharing.

In this option, conflicting national priorities drive national policies which in turn shape force structure. At the extreme, the U.S. Congress exerts pressure and threatens to legislate a unilateral withdrawal from Europe, in accordance with the old Mansfield Amendments of 1973. These circumstances are intended to encourage increased allied defense expenditure.

Ironically, internal political pressure within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) for substantial troop reductions, in light of a greatly reduced European perception of the Soviet threat and demographic and environmental concerns, creates a call for expulsion of foreign troops, labeled occupation forces. The FRG then negotiates successfully within the Western European Union (WEU) for WEU to Warsaw Pact (WP) conventional arms reductions.

It is possible that within the next few years, the United States may react to U.S. domestic and European pressures to greatly reduce our influence in NATO or actually redeploy our forces from Europe to the United States. These forces would then serve as NATO's strategic reserve. In this scenario what the United States wanted was to encourage increased allied defense

expenditure. What we got was possible troop expulsion and reduced political influence in NATO. If U.S. Congressional reaction directly correlates to public reaction, we would remove our forces from Europe and they might then serve as part of NATO's strategic reserve. It is also possible we would secede from the NATO Alliance altogether. Our strategic goals would evolve around CONUS defense in the absence of a strong alliance. We would then have to make difficult choices concerning our future from among the strategic options available, e.g., neoisolationism, selective engagement/disengagement, or interventionism; where:

Neoisolationism is the adoption of a policy orientation paralleling that of the Carter years (pre-1980), characterized by international retrenchment and accommodation of adversaries, including the following measures:

- Significant reduction in the defense budget in absolute terms.
- Significant reduction in conventional forces, particularly ground forces.
- No significant modernization of nuclear forces; strong pressure for significant reductions in existing forces, if linked to an arms control agreement.
- Massive reduction in European forward-based U.S. forces.
- Rejection of military intervention as an instrument of policy, with the possible exception of Central America or in the context of rescue operations.
- Contraction of other alliance security arrangements, including severance of diplomatic relations and/or security assistance

programs with conservative authoritarian regimes; where:

Selective Engagement/Disengagement is the adoption of a policy orientation similar to that of the Nixon-Ford years, entailing more moderate actions similar to the following:

- Modest reduction in the defense budget in absolute terms.
- No increase, and probably reductions, in nuclear and conventional forces.
- Modest reductions in other than European forward-based/forward-deployed U.S. forces.
- Increased reliance on air and naval general purpose forces, relative to ground forces.
- Reduced willingness to rely on direct military intervention abroad.
- No significant expansion of formal or informal security arrangements; selective reduction in level of U.S. involvement in other existing arrangements; where:

Intervention is the adoption of a high-profile, activist, high-risk policy orientation reminiscent of the Kennedy-Johnson years and, in a somewhat muted form, the first Reagan Administration, which entails actions such as the following:

- Increase in the defense budget in absolute terms.
- Significant increase in nuclear and conventional forces of all types.

- Rejection or avoidance of arms control agreements (but not necessarily negotiations) with the Soviet Union.
- Increase in forward-based ground and tactical air forces, and in forward-deployed naval and Marine forces in non-European regions.
- Strong reaffirmation of existing non-European U.S. security commitments, coupled with an expansion of formal and informal security arrangements; security assistance programs; and basing, access, and overflight agreements.
- Increased willingness to use force and to conduct direct military intervention, unilaterally or in concert with other nations, in Central America, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia.

U.S. anger, provoked by European calls for expulsion, would favor the latter national policy of interventionism. This crisis would then drive us to set the force structure variable dials to a larger, more flexible composition of forces with expanded mission capabilities and increased, diversified forward stationing. Defense spending would necessarily increase to balance the Soviet threat without reliance on the NATO Alliance. The overall risk is seen as balanced, due in part to U.S. buildup in response to WEU and WP conventional arms control agreement reductions. As separate defense structures, the United States and the WEU still are predictable wartime allies and peacetime rapprochement remains viable.

Option 2. The selected driver--the environment; condition--crisis; and the issues--trade and budget.

In this option, a crisis in the threat, economic, diplomatic, or psychosociological environments, may cause a larger force structure to develop. A crisis in the threat could be triggered by a number of events or actions which precipitates a higher level of readiness alert in

NATO, e.g., Soviet conservatives revolt and replace the Gorbachev regime; massive deployment of the Soviet Navy; reversal of announced Soviet troop withdrawals; armed suppression of internal Soviet and WP dissident demonstrations. A crisis in the economic environment could be triggered by an escalating series of trade barriers among the U.S., Europe, and Far East trading partners. A crisis could also be generated in the diplomatic environment by announced withdrawals of key NATO members from the alliance in favor of neutral and nonaligned status (the FRG, France, the Benelux, the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey). Examples of crises in the psychosociological environment could be increased escalation of drug-related crime and political corruption, the spiraling increase in AIDS-related cases and disinformation campaigning to link the source to Americans, or the spread of Communist insurgencies to Mexico and the rest of Latin America.

In any of these environmental crises, selected issues will pale by comparison with the driver behind the crisis. The trade issue, encompassing deficits, debtor nation status, the "buy out" of America, heightened competition or Soviet economic collapse, could lead to armed conflict by itself, as previously indicated; but when a crisis in other than the economic environment occurs, the trade issue serves only to enhance or detract from the immediate national security danger. The same projection can be made of the budget issue, which currently occupies the center of the planning arena.

Regardless of which environmental crisis we select, our strategic focus will be on restoring the stability of that environment. Concepts or means to attain this objective will require additional money, manpower and materiel resources, regardless of the "ways" we select. Variable dial settings will all be set in the "more of everything" mode until the danger is alleviated or restored to a suitable level of stability. Since time will be very important, the increases in manpower and materiel necessary to carry out the restoration plan could cause a return to the drafting of men

(and women), massive procurement of materiel from foreign sources, a revitalization of the U.S. industrial base, or development of innovative leasing arrangements.

This option, in effect, previews our preparations for war. The risk of war is dramatic should a real crisis develop in the environment described in this scenario. Perhaps the best way to negate this increased risk is by planning and testing the alternative ways to resolve the crises proposed above before they occur.

The concepts of a limited draft, massive foreign and domestic purchases in a severely time-constrained delivery schedule, and the leasing rather than purchasing of one U.S. weapon system all need to be tested if the Army leadership plans on implementing such concepts during national security emergencies.

Option 3. The selected driver--resources; condition--crisis; and the issues--arms control, burdensharing, and budget.

In this option, the scenario is constructed around a dramatic reduction in the DOD budget due to increased emphasis on domestic concerns. Although such a situation is realistic, the immediate reaction of military professionals is negative; however, such a scenario may enhance and strengthen our search for realistic alternatives. Conventional arms control negotiations will become essential in such a scenario and will move to become the nation's "centerpiece of foreign policy." Significant reductions of U.S. and NATO forces in Europe will only take place within the framework of NATO's objectives; however, military concerns will be overshadowed by political necessities. Active force structure will be cut since there are inadequate basing facilities available in the United States and alternative missions have not been fully developed and marketed. The major force structure options remaining that are viable are expanding the Reserve Component and greatly expanding strategic lift capabilities through bilateral agreements with

non-NATO allies and other friendly trading partners (in addition to NATO agreements).

The impact of successful allied burdensharing agreements, as a result of U.S. Congressional pressure on our allies, will also serve to reduce U.S. active force structure forward stationed in Europe. If these two significant issues are not addressed in consort (for purposes of this scenario), separate actions on them might result in consecutive reductions. Coordinating the issues by resolving the burdensharing issue prior to concluding conventional arms control agreements will enable the U.S. and NATO members to restructure risks, roles, and responsibilities in preparation for NATO's ultimate force reduction regime in the Conventional Stability Talks (Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Negotiations or whatever the final, formal designation of conventional arms control talks becomes).

If the budget issue of zero-to-negative defense expenditure growth is added to the scenario development which also results in force structure reductions, the United States would face a triple-option attack on force structure. Advocates of low cost, low tech solutions will not realistically be able to defend against such an attack. If we do slow down our current rush to arms control; reevaluate our burdensharing "bludgeoning" tactics; seek low cost, low tech solutions with an appropriate mix of high cost, high-tech potential stockage; shrink our self-imposed worldwide commitments selectively; continue to consolidate headquarters; and, enhance host nation support efforts and NATO cooperative research and development, we might limit troop reduction damage by balancing the overall risk.

- In such a resource-constrained scenario, we may want to stabilize the risk by adopting the concepts presented above or by seeking other alternatives. In any case we will most likely have less resources with which to accomplish national security objectives. The variable dials will be set at smaller, highly mobile, highly lethal active forces;

increased Reserve Component forces; and balanced strategic and conventional forces, predominantly stationed within the United States and its territories, with self-imposed, reduced worldwide responsibilities.

Option 4. The selected driver--capabilities; condition--crisis; and the issues--arms control and threat perception.

The construct of capabilities includes quantity, quality and high technology relative to both nuclear and conventional forces. At one extreme a nuclear free Europe may evolve in the next decade as a result of a continuing series of Soviet initiatives to reduce the threat. This may increase pressure for conventional parity through arms control, high cost, high-tech solutions, or restructuring forces or war fighting doctrine as possible results. In the absence of a nuclear free Europe, less pressure for high cost, high-tech solutions and arms control may prevail in a budget constrained environment, again supported by a decreasing Western threat perception.

This option is driven by emerging technologies with highly lethal and accurate characteristics whose destructive potential nearly equates to nuclear weapons. Conventional arms control negotiations may limit *fielding* of emerging technologies in Europe, but not development and production in the more prosperous nations of NATO and the WP. Resulting restrictions in the CFE process may cause two distinct types of U.S. force structure to develop--NATO assigned and CONUS forces.

CONUS forces, including both active and Reserve Components, will be equipped and structured as necessary to accommodate the new technologies. CONUS forces will fit budgetary constraints with active forces structured in the small, highly lethal, highly mobile model; and reserve forces proportionally structured with one-third reflecting the CONUS model and two-thirds maintaining a Europe-reinforcing model.

U.S. NATO forces, affected by substantial reductions in tanks, artillery and armored troop carriers, will be compelled to initiate a lighter, less costly force design, but mission capabilities will improve due to requirements for rigid NATO rationalization, standardization, and interoperability, and cooperative research and development. The NATO Alliance remains strong in this scenario, but at substantially lower levels of forces. The risk is reduced by arms control agreement in Europe and by the increased lethality and accuracy of CONUS-based weaponry and the accompanying conventional deterrence enhancements. The variable dial settings include a smaller, lighter force structure in all armies, East and West, in Europe and small active forces in CONUS, equipped with the emerging technologies. The Reserve Component grows at a one-for-one pace of active reduction to reserve increase.

Option 5. The selected driver--none; condition--calm, lack of crisis; and the issues--arms control and burdensharing.

In the absence of a major crisis, force structuring will become evolutionary and influenced by successful resolution of one or more issues. In this option, NATO conventional arms control objectives are attained, reaching an agreement with the WP which provides NATO greater security and stability, and reduces WP surprise attack capability, at lower levels and cost.¹⁸ The U.S. reduction is significant at 25 percent of land forces stationed in Europe.¹⁹

An arms control agreement will have an immediate impact on resolving the burdensharing issue, particularly in mission specialization, with the same results if burdensharing is resolved prior to arms control agreement. Reductions of combat forces will force NATO to make some tough decisions. Examples might include:

- Some conversion of "have not" nations and European Home Defense Brigades to combat

support arms while U.S. combat support arms units are converted to combat maneuver forces.²⁰

- Air Defense and Combat Service Support (CSS) missions are candidates for partial conversions.
- Adoption of one of the alternative defense plans collected and explained by Jonathan Dean may be initiated. Choices include the Afheldt plan, the Study Group of Alternative Security Planning (SAS) plan, Hanning's fire wall, wide area territorial defense, and civilian based defense.²¹

The U.S. Army would also face some tough decisionmaking, particularly involving whether to take the reductions out of the force structure, as mandated, or to use the reductions to fill CONUS shortfall; staff CONUS security missions such as supporting the antidrug war; form nation building units or other politically attractive alternatives.²² The risk is assumed to be less than it is today (in this scenario) due to a successful conventional arms control agreement which achieves the NATO and CFE mandate objectives cited above (note 18). If a conventional arms control agreement is not reached, and burdensharing becomes the dominant issue, risk must be assumed to remain status quo, since burdensharing only reflects the NATO side of the East-West confronting forces. Again, working burdensharing and arms control issues in consort will alleviate concerns for double jeopardy in force reductions.

- The variable dial settings are turned to a smaller force structure by evolution, not crisis condition. Capabilities and composition of the force may likewise evolve; however, successful resolution of either the burdensharing or arms control issues will automatically set the forward stationing dial to less and strategic lift dial to more.

Option 6. The selected driver--none; condition--calm, lack of crisis; and the issues--arms control and burdensharing remain unresolved.

Without consensus and resolution by NATO to address the difficult issues of burdensharing and arms control, the force will slowly evolve to find less expensive tactical, operational and/or doctrinal solutions to the current East-West imbalance. Without an arms control agreement, the Soviets will continue to build up the quality of conventional forces, but perhaps only increase quantity at the margins (particularly naval forces). Although there will be national reductions in NATO force structure, stemming from defense budget reductions, introduction of emerging technologies to increase "quality" may redress the force quantity imbalance. The risk will increase in this scenario, but only at the margins. Without resolution of the arms control and burdensharing issues, nations will have only limited opportunities to reduce defense expenditure. The evolutionary, year-by-year force structuring process may find the United States and NATO possessing a suboptimal force in Europe, incapable of mounting a strong defense. We may want arms control and greater allied burdensharing, but in the absence of successful negotiations, the United States may desire to balance the marginal risk by opting for quality, high cost, high-tech weaponry and equipment. In any event, evolutionary force structure design will find the U.S. and European armies planning for smaller forces with increased capabilities as the major variable dial settings for the future force.

SUMMARY

In summary, the purpose of this paper was to stimulate ideas and foster a better understanding of the driving forces, conditions, issues, and variables involved in how to think about force structuring the armies in NATO and in the U.S. Army in the next decade.

General Goodpaster's three questions--What do we really want? What concepts are available? What resources are needed to support those concepts?--were treated by the author as a package, not individually. Six options for the future were developed by selecting external "drivers" which press the system to unplanned decisions; creating conditions of crisis or calm; supplementing the discussion with consideration of national security issues; assessing the impacts those issues might have upon force structure; and finally, dial setting the structural variables of the future force in an effort to bound the debate on what the future force will look like.

Woven throughout the paper are postulates and author-sponsored recommendations and derivative assumptions. The postulates include:

- We should not pretend that identifying and rationalizing strategic objectives are any more than the beginning of a process of trying to know what we want of the world.
- Force planning is complex and is characterized by an interrelated series of analyses to determine an *affordable* force.
- Force structuring is a function of national policy, the environment, resources and capabilities in conditions of crisis or calm.
- Burdensharing is the most complex issue facing the NATO Alliance.
- Soviet threat perception is the most important issue impacting upon force structure.
- Arms control is a complex issue which is interrelated to the issues of burdensharing, threat perception, and budget decline.

- Trade issues may ultimately have the greatest impact on all national security decisions.
- Zero-to-negative defense budget growth is a reality for the next several U.S. Administrations.
- Long-range force structure planners need to assess external futurist predictions.
- Time is considered the critical path to mobilization.

The recommendations and derivative assumptions include:

- Assign burdensharing roles and responsibilities in accordance with what each nation does best.
- Mr. Gorbachev's next strategic moves are:
 - Withdrawal of SNF in Eastern Europe.
 - Destruction of the Berlin Wall.
 - Disbandment of the WTO.
- Make the compromise decisions of low cost, low tech or high cost, high-tech solutions now.
- Resolve the burdensharing issue prior to concluding arms control agreements to produce a "consensus-driven" NATO reduction plan.
- Explore alternatives to force inactivations other than in the combat units including nation building, antidrug war, civic action.
- Recognize the "covert" trade war and begin schooling in how-to-fight in it using integrative economic and military arts.

- Meld force planning effort into one exercise to leverage planner time.
- Shrink self-imposed commitments to the world.
- Overlay solid, practical, ethical American business practices like lease versus buy, sale and lease back, leveraging and subcontracting to buy more defense with less money.

ENDNOTES

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5. *Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988-89, pp. 10-21.
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7. LTC David E. Shaver, "A Case for a Larger Army in the 21st Century," Military Studies Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 20, 1987, p. 1.
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16. Theodore J. Gordon, *The Future*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965, p. 56.
17. U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Long-Range Planning Guidance*, Revised Edition, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, July 1988, p. 11, which states that (conditions) ". . . are likely to result in smaller, but more effective, Army units in the future." The document was prepared for signature by John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army, and General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff, Army.
18. Strategic Studies Institute, p. ix.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 82. The authors project that a "significant agreement" of approximately 50,000 soldiers is a potential outcome of future Conventional Stability Talks (CST) in Europe.
20. During a NATO Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) "Makefast" conference in May 1986, the author presented "Landmine Warfare in the Year 2000" to Army engineer general officers from seven NATO countries. The striking difference between "have and have not" armies influenced the author to seek ways of sharing high-tech munitions among NATO members in time of war. This concept allows transfer of ground-emplaced Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM) to NATO "have not" engineers.

21. Jonathan Dean, "Alternative Defense: Answer to NATO's Central Front Problems?", *International Affairs*, Winter 87-88, pp. 61-82:

- The Afheldt Plan "structures NATO armies unilaterally with 'light infantry commandos equipped with antitank weapons' followed behind by an artillery network . . . (with) tanks . . . gradually eliminated . . ."
- The SAS plan uses a "static 'web' of light infantry much like Afheldt's followed by armored formations ('spikers') . . ."
- Hanning's fire wall which proposed ". . . an uninhabited barrier . . . saturated with fire (indirect). Behind the 'fire wall' would be antitank units equipped with precision-guided missiles . . ."
- Wide area territorial defense "envision[s] a frontier defense zone 80-100 kilometers deep in which barriers and blocking units channel attacking units toward concentrations of fire . . ."
- Civilian-based defense . . . in which cities would . . . engage in passive (nonviolent) resistance.

22. Strategic Studies Institute, p. 83.